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I. INTRODUCTION
The policy in the U.S. military that places limits on the number of years that an individual may remain in the military absent a promotion is called up-or-out policy. The ostensible rationale for this policy is to weed out individuals who are not qualified to assume managerial positions as their careers progress.
Because of inconsistencies in data reporting, it is difficult to compute the exact number of individuals who separate from the military due to up-or-out policy. Our best estimates, however, indicate this number is surprisingly small-fewer than 1,000 officers and 1,000 enlisted members per year.
The dominant effect of up-or-out policy is to force individuals to switch from operational positions, which many prefer, to managerial positions. For example, pilots huce to fly, and may not be interested in commanding a squadron. Similarly, enlisted aircraft technicians may be content to remain on the flight line, and may have little interest in supervisory positions. It is not obvious that the military services benefit by forcing these skilled individuals to choose between promotion and separation.
On the other hand, there are several reasons why up-or-out policy may actually improve personnel management. We will argue that up-or-out policy may remove a "glut" of poor performers in the intermediate ranks, thereby enhancing promotion opportunities for their stronger counterparts. These enhanced promotion opportunities may, in turn, improve the morale, retention, and performance of the stronger individuals.
Another argument often advanced is that older individuals lack the physical fitness required to continue performing in operational positions. An up-or-out policy is therefore necessary to force older individuals either to switch from operational to managerial positions or to separate from the military. We present empirical evidence that physical fitness is not a serious impediment to performance for helicopter pilots or, more surprisingly, even for fighter and attack pilots.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we review the military's current up-or-out policies. These policies are different for officers than for enlisted personnel, and also vary in some details across the services. We also report approximate tabulations of the number of up-or-out separations that occurred in a recent I I year. Section III offers several possible rationales for the up-or-out system. In particular,
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an up-or-out policy mzy enable the services to better identify candidates for subsequent promotions and command responsibilities.
Section IV reviews the hypothesis that an up-or-out policy is necessary because older individuals suffer a decline in physical fitness. Our data appear to refute this 3 hypothesis, at least for certain pilot communities. In Section V, we recommend experimentation with a new career track for pilots. This new track would not require i forced separation due to failure to promote. Finally, the paper concludes with some suggestions for further research. The policy for enlisted personnel is described in Table 1 . For each enlisted paygrade, there is a high year of tenure (HYT) beyond which an individual cannot continue absent a promotion. There is considerable variation among the services in their HYT policies. The Air Force allows an individual to continue through YOS 20 as an E-4. The Navy allows continuation through only YOS 10 as an E-4, but allows continuation through YOS 20 as an E-5. The Army and the Marine Corps are even more stringent. They require promotion to E-5 for continuation beyond YOS 8, and promotion to E-6 for continuation beyond YOS 13. It is difficult to assess the exact number of individuals who leave the military because of up-or-out policies. The service personnel systems assign separation codes to each individual who leaves the military. Unfortunately, "up-or-out" is not an explicit separation code for any service. Rather, individuals who leave for this reason are assigned some other separation code, depending on their service policies and possibly the inclination of their commanding officers.
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The number of up-or-out separations among enlisted personnel may be I approximated in the following manner.' The Army, for example, allows an individual to continue through YOS 8 as an E-4. Presumably, most Army soldiers who separate at paygrade E-4 in YOS 9 do so because of HYT policy. However, some of these individuals may have separated even in the absence of HYT policy. Therefore, the numbers to follow 3 should be interpreted as upper bounds. As indicated in Table 2 , there were 467 separations at paygrade E-4 and YOS 9 in FY 1990. Similarly, there were 128 separations among Navy personnel at paygrade E-4 in YOS 11, and 63 separations among Marine Corps personnel at paygrade E-4 in YOS 9. 
1
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There were also HYT separations at paygrade E-5 among Army and Marine Corps m perscnnel. We estimate that there were 202 separations from the Army at paygrade E-5 in YOS 14, and 11 separations from the Marine Corps at paygrade E-5 in YOS 14. In total,
I
th.re were at most 871 up-or-out separations of enlisted personnel in FY 1990.
The calculations for officers are somewhat more complex, and are reported in 3   Tables 3 through 6. Table 3 first presents the tail of the YOS distribution of all Army officers promoted from rank 0-3 (captain) to rank 0-4 (major) during FY 1989. Nearly 94 percent of these promotions were earned by officers with at most YOS 12, and over 60 percent were earned by officers at exactly YOS 12. To develop an upper bound, we assume that all separations by captains in YOS 13 through 19 were involuntary. This I assumption seems plausible, because the draw of military retirement pay after a 20-year career makes it unlikely that many individuals with this much seniority would separate U
The data in this section were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
voluntarily. There may be a few such individuals, however, who had prior enlisted service and are partially exempt from up-or-out rules. The fifth column of Table 3 
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I1. THEORETICAL MODELS
Up-or-out policies are not unique to the military. In universities, assistant professors who do not receive tenure are forced to leave. Similarly, attorneys who are not offered partnerships in law firms are also forced to leave. Why don't universities or law firms simply retain these individuals as permanent, junior members?
A. A MODEL OF TENURE
Two articles in the economics literature have recently investigated the up-or-out phenomenon [1 and 2]. Consider the following highly stylized example. A worker's career extends over two time periods. All workers within a class are considered homogeneous during the first period, hence they all earn the same wage. During the first period, they may also undertake investments that will enhance their productivity in the second period. An investment in this context is any expenditure of time, effort, or money that places the worker on the "fast track" rather than the "slow track." For example, the worker may put in longer hours on the job, or expend more effort establishing business contacts.
An investment makes it more likely that the worker achieves the fast track, but does not guarantee this result. In Table 7 , workers who choose to invest and those who do not invest each have a probability of achieving the fast track (labelled "high productivity" in the table). This probability equals 0.4 in the absence of any investment, but increases to 0.6 if the investment is made. As an alternative to an up-or-out contract, the employer might retain all workers but simply pay them according to their revealed productivity levels. We refer to this alternative as a conventional contract. We will investigate conventional contracts fast, then we will
show that a possible weakness of conventional contracts is alleviated by an up-or-out contract.
In Table 7 , an investment costs the worker $100 and, again, serves to increase the I probability of achieving high productivity from 0.4 to 0.6. Under a conventional contract, workers are retained regardless of their productivity I level, but are paid salaries equal to their value to the employer. Hence, a worker's expected gross salary is a probability-weighted average of the values $3,000 and $1,000. If the 3 worker invests, an expected net salary is obtained after subtracting the cost of the investment. Given the numbers in Table 7 , a worker would always choose to invest 3 because, by doing so, a net gain of $300 is made.
The putative weakness of a conventional contract is as follows. The employer,
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regardless of the true assessment of the worker's productivity, always has an incentive to declare the worker as low-productivity. By doing so, the employer can pay all workers a salary of $ 1,000, even though 60 percent of them have value $3,000. The employer thus enjoys a net gain of $2,000 for each high-productivity worker that the employer deliberately mislabels as low-productivity.
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2 In our example of professors, other universities can observe professors' publication records, but not their teaching ability. Similarly, other law firms can observe attorneys' performances in court, but not their ability to draw contracts. If these examples seem unpalatable, we may assume instead that I workers' investments build "specific" human capital. This is human capital, which even if observed by other employers, is of greater value to the current employer than to others.
It might be thought that a high-productivity worker in this situation could benefit by transferring to a different employer. Recall, however, our assumption that productivity is not observed (or not valued) by other, potential employers in the market. Therefore, high-productivity workers have no method of demonstrating their productivity levels to other potential employers.
When workers become aware of their employer's strategy, they, in turn, no longer have an incentive to invest. There is no reason to expend resources investing, in order to enhance their productivity in the second period, if increases in productivity are never rewarded by their employer. Hence, in the final equilibrium, no investment is undertaken.
Now consider an up-or-out contract. Under this arrangement, the employer retains only the high-productivity workers, and pays them a salary equal to their value in production ($3,000 in our example). Low-productivity workers are fired, and must seek employment elsewhere. We assume in Table 7 that these workers' value to other employers is $750. With an up-or-out contract, the worker still chooses to invest, this time enjoying a net gain of $350.
Finally, we must show that, unlike the situation with conventional contracts, the up-or-out contract gives the employer no incentive to deliberately mislabel highproductivity workers as low-productivity. With a conventional contract, employers had this incentive because it enabled them to retain high-productivity workers (worth $3,000 each) and pay them the low-productivity wage ($1,000 each). But with an up-or-out contract, all workers declared low-productivity must be fired. Hence the employer would end up firing not only workers who are truly low-productivity, but also some highproductivity workers deliberately mislabeled as low-productivity workers. Firing highproductivity workers, whom it was profitable to employ in the first place, is clearly not an optimal strategy.
The model predicts that the up-or-out contract keeps employers honest, and removes their incentive to mislabel the productivity of their workers. Hence the workers retain their incentive to invest in their own productivity.
It is doubtful whether the above stylized example could be used to justify the up-orout system employed by the military. It is clear that the military wants to encourage individuals to work hard and invest in their own productivity. Yet the military has no apparent incentive to mislabel its high-productivity individuals as low-productivity. On the contrary, the services acknowledge high-productivity individuals by selecting them for promotion and (in the case of officers) command. i More fundamentally, it is not clear that the model described above is logically I consistent. Employers are in constant competition for workers. An employer who offered conventional contracts, but who acknowledged high-productivity workers, could bid 3 workers away from competitors with reputations for deception. Honest employers would thrive in the marketplace, so that competition would serve as the mechanism to enforce 3 recognition of high-productivity workers. Up-or-out contracts do not seem to be necessary for this purpose.
B. AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL
The economics literature provides an alternative model that may be adapted to I explain the up-or-out phenomenon. Lazear [3] has developed a rationale for mandatory retirement in the civilian sector. Under Lazear's model, firms pay workers wages below I the value of their output during the early years of employment. However, firms pay workers wages above the value of their output during the later years of employment. For workers who remain with the firm long enough, the two effects will cancel out, so that the discounted value of wages is equal to the discounted value of output over the worker's 3 entire career.
Firms have two incentives for structuring contracts in this fashion. First, contracts 3 of this sort appeal mostly to workers who intend to remain with the firm for a lengthy career. By offering these contracts, the firm tends to attract more "stable" workers. Hence a deferred-compensation contract is a clever mechanism for inducing workers to reveal information about their intentions.
Second, deferred-compensation contracts discourage workers from shirking their responsibilities. A worker who is dismissed for shirking will not be able to recover the loss incurred in the early years when that worker's wage was below the value of output.
By offering these contracts, the firm may be more confident in the worker's performance, and need not spend as much time monitoring the worker.
3
The difficulty with deferred-compensation contracts arises when workers remain with the firm for too long. Once payback for the early years has been achieved, workers 3 continue to receive wages above the value of their output. Hence a point may be reached where a worker prefers to remain with the firm, but the firm prefers for the worker to 3 leave. Lazear used this insight to explain mandatory retirement provisions, which require workers to retire at a prescribed age.
I
This model may be adapted to explain up-or-out provisions in the military. If allowed to remain in the military, individuals on a low-productivity track would receive undeserved longevity increases in excess of the value of their output. Up-or-out separations are roughly analogous to the separations for shirking in Lazear's model. In addition, up-or-out provisions provide a bureaucratic, impersonal method for weeding-out poor performers, without giving the appearance of vindictiveness on the part of the individual's commanding officer.
C. A PREFERRED MODEL
In this subsection, we develop our preferred model for up-or-out contracts in the military. We first consider the equilibrium rank distribution when the system does not have any up-or-out provisions. We begin in the upper half of Table 8 with 200 0-3s, equally divided between high-productivity "leaders" and low-productivity "non-leaders." We assume that productivity cannot be observed until rank 0-4, where we begin with 50 individuals of each type. We also begin with 30 leaders at rank 0-5. On the contrary, consider an up-or-out system, as illustrated in the lower half of Table 8 . We begin with the same rank distribution in period 1 as in the previous analysis.
I
Once again, 30 0-4 leaders are promoted to rank 0-5 at the end of period 1. Now, however, the 20 remaining 0-4 leaders as well as the 50 0-4 non-leaders are subject to an 3 up-or-out provision, and must separate at the end of period 1. Thus, the 0-4 ranks are completely cleared at the end of each period, through either promotion ("up") or separation 3 ("out"). These individuals are replaced when 100 O-3s are promoted. Because productivity still cannot be observed among 0-3s, we expect 50 leaders and 50 non-leaders among those promoted.
This rank distribution is sustainable in equilibrium. The differences from the m previous analysis are as follows. Most importantly, the up-or-out system provides 30 0-5 leaders, so that the 0-5 level is now populated entirely with leaders. This result obtains because the 0-4 ranks are no longer clogged with non-leaders, thus leaving room to promote leaders through rank 0-4 and all the way to rank 0-5. On the other hand, the 20 I 0-4 leaders who are not selected for promotion must separate at the end of each period. 
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In this example, the up-or-out system yields several benefits. By providing sharper discrimination, the service is better able to identify candidates for promotions and command responsibilities. This feature may also improve morale among the more capable officers. More of these officers are selected for promotion, so these officers' achievements are recognized and rewarded.
A study by Spruill and Cavalluzzo [4] estimated the value that pilots place on fasttrack assignments. Specifically, the study investigated the costs and benefits of consolidating aircraft squadrons. Consolidating two squadrons into one would cut in half the number of department-head billets available for 0-4s, as well as the number of command billets available for O-5s.
According to this study, pilots would be injured in two ways by these billet reductions. First, promotion boards may consider experience as a department head or squadron commander among the criteria for promotion. Second, pilots may value experience in these positions over and above their effect on the probability of promotion. Table 9 reports Spruill and Cavalluzzo's estimates of the dollar value of these losses. Their estimates are based on a survey of 1,798 Navy fighter and attack pilots, and the values are expressed in 1980 dollars. The column labelled "Earnings Loss" reflects the lower lifetime earnings associated with a career path having a lower probability of promotion. The column labelled "Intrinsic Loss" measures the lifetime value that pilots place on department-head and squadron-commander billets, beyond their effect on the probability of promotion. 
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The latter numbers, in particular, are non-negligible. Apparently, many pilots value the opportunity to serve in middle-management positions. In our current application, an j up-or-out system would improve the probability of a more capable officer receiving a department-head and squadron-commander assignment. These pilots could avoid some of 
IV. UP-OR-OUT AND PHYSICAL FITNESS
Another argument often advanced in favor of up-or-out policy is that older individuals lack the physical fitness required to continue performing in operational positions. An up-or-out policy is therefore necessary to force older individuals to switch from operational to management positions, or else to separate. This argument may have some validity for enlisted personnel in strenuous occupations such as infantry. Among officers, however, the evidence is decidedly mixed. We will examine some data for pilots, arguably the most physically demanding of all officer occupations. Although older individuals are still assigned to pilot billets, one might ask whether their performance remains safe and effective. 
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE UP-OR-OUT POLICY
It may be sensible to suspend the up-or-out policy in selected occupations where physical fitness is not a constraint, and where promotion to management is not essential. This has been done for Army warrant-officer helicopter pilots. These individuals are on a separate track, and do not compete with other officers for command positions. It may be possible to establish similar tracks in other occupations.
A related possibility is to have two tracks within the same occupation, one for individuals seeking promotion to management, and another for individuals content to remain in operational positions. An individual would not have to make an immediate choice between these two tracks. At some point toward the middle of his career, an individual selected for promotion could transfer to the management track. Conversely, individuals passed over for promotion could remain in the operational track for the remainder of their careers. One benefit of this proposal is that it would avoid having pilots, whose training costs up to $2 million, acting in managerial positions that do not fully utilize their training.
The study by Spruill and Cavalluzzo estimated the willingness of pilots to enroll in an operational track that would not involve command responsibilities. Specifically, 1,798 Navy fighter and attack pilots were asked the following question: 5 Suppose that aviators could choose permanent duty involving operational flying as an alternative to the normal [unrestricted line officer] path. This duty would allow for career flying without forced separation due to failure to promote. Which career path would you choose?
The operational track was preferred by 67.8 percent of O-2s, 62.3 percent of 0-3s, 49.8 percent of O-4s, and 31.3 percent of O-5s. From this evidence, it appears that younger pilots, at least, would be seriously interested in a career track that allowed them to continue flying without concern about future promotion. Although only a minority of senior pilots express a preference for the operational track, many of their colleagues may already have left the military in order to continue flying in the commercial sector. We recommend that the operational track be given further consideration.
5 Reference [4] , Appendix G, page G-15.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusion of this paper is that very few military personnel separate due to up-or-out policy. We estimate that in a recent year fewer than 1,000 officers and 1,000 enlisted members separated for this reason. The more important effect of up-or-out policy may be to force individuals "up" rather than "out." For example, Spruill and Cavalluzzo report that many pilots would prefer an operational track that involved more flying, without command responsibilities. The absence of such a track (except for Army warrant officers) forces pilots into managerial positions toward which many are ambivalent.
Our evidence indicates that physical fitness is not an impediment to performance for older pilots. Over 90 percent of Marine Corps fighter and attack pilots are assigned to flying billets, even in years-of-service 15 through 20. Although the percentage is lower for Air Force fighter and bomber pilots, the difference may be the result of deliberate policy rather than a deterioration in pilots' physical fitness. Further study of Air Force personnel management could shed light on this issue.
We recommend that further study also be made of an operational track for pilots.
The feasibility and desirability of this track could be assessed along several fronts. First, additional surveys of pilots would reveal their willingness to participate in an operational track, Input could also be collected from personnel managers in the various aviation communities. Most importantly, analytical work would be required to estimate the net cost savings and expected changes in readiness that would accompany the introduction of an operational track for pilots.
